HCA 67 (2003) is a critical and damning indictment against the unlawful, unconstitutional private corporation calling itself The Australian Government that has created a tyranny over the people through deception and fraud.
Our Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901 was a contract written by the People of the Commonwealth of Australia to set up a Parliament to serve the nation. Section 51 details the duties of this Commonwealth Government.
No matter how hard you look, there is no mention of The Australian Government in the Constitution. Nor have We the People ever voted to enact a legal entity called The Australian Government.
This fiction was created by the political parties when they registered their own private corporation in the USA with its own Copyrighted Constitution, and then convinced the unsuspecting Australian people that it was merely a name change and the Parliament would continue sitting as normal after elections with full authority.
But we all know those elections are forced on us, that the candidates are chosen by the political parties and not by We the People as mandated in Sections 7 and 24 our Constitution. Only We can select our representatives, but the parties have denied us that right.
In law, any contract that is not signed in full knowledge and disclosure by both parties is null and void: It doesn’t exist, and no one is bound to obey it.
The political party government create what appear to be contracts with us by sending “fines”, Rates Notices, and government forms which require us to respond. As soon as we do, we have accepted a contract with The Australian Government. But if we realize later that we have accepted a contract under false pretenses, we can refuse to honour it.
We reproduce part of the HCA 67 court transcript from section 203 to 213 which exposes the treason and treachery before the High Court. Yet, has anything changed since this decision was handed down? Did the High Court do its job and order the political parties to stand down from government, and hold fresh elections of the people? After reading this, ask yourself how much you trust the government and judiciary of this country?
Extracts from HCA 67 (2003)
203. As to the version of the Australia Act enacted by the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland[210], I deny the right of that Parliament in 1986 (even at the request and by the consent of the constituent Parliaments of Australia[211]) to enact any law affecting in the slightest way the constitutional arrangements of this independent nation[212]. The notion that, in 1986, Australia was dependent in the slightest upon, or subject to, the legislative power of the United Kingdom Parliament for its constitutional destiny is one that I regard as fundamentally erroneous both as a matter of constitutional law and of political fact. Indeed, I regard it as absurd. Despite repeated challenges by me in these proceedings[213], no arguments were advanced to defend this last purported Imperial gesture. Mention of the United Kingdom Act in the joint reasons[214] appears to be descriptive not normative. That Act was something done, doubtless with bemusement by the British authorities, at the request of their Australian counterparts. Unfortunately, the latter remembered their legal studies decades earlier but failed to notice the intervening shift in the accepted foundation of sovereignty over Australia’s constitutional law. Sovereignty in this country belongs to the Australian people as electors. It belongs to no-one else, certainly not to the Government and Parliament of the United Kingdom elected in the House of Commons from the people of those islands and not elected at all in the House of Lords.
[210] That Act is described in its long title as one “to give effect to a request by the Parliament and Government of the Commonwealth of Australia”. In the preamble to the Act it is stated that such request and consent was made “with the concurrence of the States of Australia”. No reference is made to the assent or concurrence of the Australian people (as electors). The Act is purely intergovernmental and interparliamentary.
[211] Purportedly pursuant to the Statute of Westminster 1931 (UK): see Australia (Request and Consent) Act 1985 (Cth).
[212] cf Sue v Hill (1999) 199 CLR 462 at 487 [48]-[49], 524-525 [161]-[163]; Grain Pool of Western Australia v Commonwealth (2000) 202 CLR 479 at 523-524 [113]; Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor (2001) 207 CLR 391 at 400-401 [7], 441-443 [151]-[153].
[213] Attorney-General (WA) v Marquet [2003] HCATrans 259-260 at 4, 52-53, 84-85. See also at 127-128, 144, 147.
[214] The joint reasons at [68]-[69].
204. It was then submitted[215] that the true source of the constitutional validity of the Australia Acts, at least of the federal Act, was the legislative power given by the Constitution to the Federal Parliament to enact federal statutes as an “exercise within the Commonwealth, at the request or with the concurrence of the Parliaments of all the States directly concerned, of any power which can at the establishment of this Constitution be exercised only by the Parliament of the United Kingdom or by the Federal Council of Australasia”[216]. (I pause to observe that, if this constitutional head of power was available, it was curious indeed that it was considered necessary to bother with an enactment by the United Kingdom Parliament.) In favour of giving s 51(xxxviii) a wide meaning is the consideration mentioned by Dawson J in Polyukhovich v The Commonwealth[217] that “[a]n interpretation of the Constitution which denies the completeness of Australian legislative power is unacceptable in terms of constitutional theory and practice”.
[215] Attorney-General (WA) v Marquet [2003] HCATrans 259-260 at 4, 52-53, 85-86.
[216] Constitution, s 51(xxxviii). This power has been described as holding “the dubious distinction of being one of the most obscure and inscrutable provisions of the Constitution Act”: Craven, Secession: The Ultimate States Right, (1986) at 176.
[217] (1991) 172 CLR 501 at 638. See also McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140 at 230 per McHugh J.
205.The difficulty with this source of legislative power is immediately apparent. Section 51 of the Constitution (and thus all the legislative powers therein provided) is expressed to be “subject to this Constitution”. That important phrase subjects all federal legislation to the fundamental postulates of the Constitution. These include the provisions of Ch III, dealing with the Judicature. But they also include the provisions of Ch V with respect to the States and the requirements of s 128 concerning any alteration of the Constitution. Whatever difficulties might exist for amendment of the “covering clauses” or preamble to the Constitution, no such difficulty arises for the amendment of ss 106 and 107 which are part of the body of the constitutional text and subject, as such, to s 128[218].
[218] Gageler and Leeming, “An Australian Republic: Is a Referendum Enough?”, (1996) 7 Public Law Review 143 at 148-149.
206. The last-mentioned provision reserves to the Australian people, as electors of the Commonwealth, the power to make formal changes affecting the basic law of the nation. Any change to the basic constitutional powers of the Parliaments of the States of Australia, and to the Constitution of each State, limiting or controlling the constituent powers of those legislatures (as the Australia Act 1986 (Cth) purports to introduce) amounts to an attempt at a formal alteration to ss 106 and 107 of the Constitution. As such, it can only be effected if it is passed in accordance with s 128 of the federal Constitution. Otherwise, any such purported imposition of new limitations by federal law (or by the laws of other States) is invalid and ineffective. In accordance with s 106 of the federal Constitution, the Constitution of each State would remain as it was in 1901 until altered “in accordance with the Constitution of the State”, not as purportedly altered by a federal Act, such as the Australia Act 1986 (Cth).
207. However desirable particular provisions of the Australia Act 1986 (Cth) may seem to be, it is a statute of one constituent part of the Commonwealth purporting to alter the Constitutions of other constituent parts of the Commonwealth made without the one essential and undoubted “entrenched” requirement for such alterations, namely the participation of the electors of the Commonwealth in an amendment approved by them in accordance with s 128.
208. Convenience may ultimately overwhelm these legal and logical difficulties. The “march of history” may pass by my concerns[219]. The passage of time may accord constitutional legitimacy and respectability to what has happened. Constitutional law is often dragged by the chariot of political realities, at the end of a long chain. The legislative and governmental unanimity, and the generally advantageous nature of the purported changes in the Australia Acts, may reward those measures with perceived effectiveness that becomes unquestioned law with the passing years. However, in case a similar attempt is made in the future to circumvent s 128 of the Constitution in such a way, by intergovernmental agreement and legislation without the participation of the people of Australia as electors, I lift my voice in protest[220].
[219] Bonser v La Macchia (1969) 122 CLR 177 at 223 per Windeyer J.
[220] Lindell and Rose, “A Response to Gageler and Leeming: ‘An Australian Republic: Is a Referendum Enough?'”, (1996) 7 Public Law Review 155 at 156-157.
209. In the view that I take, nothing in s 6 of the Australia Acts or either of them (nor the Australia Acts (Request) Act 1985 of each State) validly authorised the imposition on a Parliament of a State by federal or foreign law of a restriction not otherwise existing at the time of the federal Constitution concerning the power of the Parliament of that State to enact laws respecting the “constitution, powers or procedure of the Parliament of the State”. On this basis, the supposed foundation in s 6 of the Australia Act, whether of the United Kingdom or of the Federal Parliament, for the effectiveness of s 13 of the 1947 Act, is unavailing. Subject to what follows, deprived of the support of s 6 of the Australia Acts, the supposed new source for the binding force of s 13 of the 1947 Act, as an entrenchment of the procedure there provided, is knocked away. It has no legal effect as such. It presents no obstacle to the presentation of the Repeal Bill and the Amendment Bill, in that order, to the Governor for the Royal Assent that will bring those measures into law.
210. The joint reasons complain[221] that the parties, interveners and amici did not challenge the validity of the Australia Acts. But that has been the problem – that governmental and political parties have not contested the validity of that legislation. They represent the very class who devised and enacted it. The constitutional arrangements of this country do not belong to them but to the people as electors for whom this Court stands guardian. It is not for parties, interveners or amici, by their agreements or silence, to oblige this Court to misapply the law – least of all constitutional law, concerned as it is with the fundamentals of government[222]. The question of validity was repeatedly raised by me during argument in these applications, as it has been in other cases. Justices of this Court owe a higher duty to the Constitution and the law. They are not hostages to the arguments of the parties. Nor are they mere arbitrators of the disputes that parties choose to define and propound.
[221] The joint reasons at [69].
[222] Roberts v Bass (2002) 77 ALJR 292 at 320-321 [143]-[144]; 194 ALR 161 at 199; British American Tobacco Australia Ltd v Western Australia (2003) 77 ALJR 1566 at 1586 [106]; 200 ALR 403 at 430; Australian Communication Exchange Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2003) 77 ALJR 1806 at 1815 [51]; 201 ALR 271 at 283.
211. Port MacDonnell Professional Fishermen’s Assn Inc v South Australia[223], to which the joint reasons refer[224], gives no support for the scheme evident in the Australia Acts. That was a case concerning the Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 (Cth) and related legislation. The “Offshore Constitutional Settlement” did not involve United Kingdom legislation. Nor was the Port MacDonnell decision concerned, as such, with the constituent power of a State Parliament. Neither did the legislation in question purport to have the effect of amending the federal Constitution (ss 106 and 107) or to impose limits or controls on the powers of those Parliaments as the Australia Acts do. The case does not, therefore, touch the concerns that I have raised. Still less does it answer those concerns. They stand unanswered.
[224] The joint reasons at [70].
212. Even if (contrary to my view) s 6 of the Australia Acts were valid, it is, in relevant respects, no more than a mirror image of s 5 of the CLVA. The only source of the purported power of “entrenchment” under it is with respect to a law “made after the commencement of this Act [1986] by the Parliament of a State respecting the constitution, powers or procedure of the Parliament of the State”. For reasons already given, the Bills of 2001 fell outside that description.
213. If (also contrary to my view) the Repeal Bill and the Amendment Bill do seek to “amend” the 1947 Act and specifically s 13, those Bills are not laws within s 6 “respecting the constitution, powers or procedure of the Parliament of the State”. Properly characterised, they are no more than laws that repeal an earlier law on the subject of electoral divisions and electoral law. Thus, giving the Australia Acts, and all of them, full force and effect according to their terms, they do not authorise or sustain the “entrenchment” purportedly contained in s 13 of the 1947 Act. Approached in either way, the attempted entrenchment is ineffective to prevent the passage of the two Bills into law. There is no legal impediment to the presentation of those Bills to the Governor in proper sequence for Her Majesty’s Assent.
